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CONFRONTATION AND THE HEARSAY RULE
In 1953, the Supreme Court refused to reverse the state conviction
of a defendant who had been incriminated by the confessions of his
co-defendants and was unable, at their joint trial, to cross-examine
the confessors.' "Basically . . . [the defendant's] objection to the in-
troduction of the confessions is that as to him they are hearsay. The
hearsay-evidence rule, with all its subtleties, anomalies and ramifica-
tions, will not be read into the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 In 1965,
however, in an opinion of breathtaking simplicity, the Court all but
transformed its argument by horrible consequence into constitutional
reality. In Pointer v. Texas3 the Court read into the Fourteenth
Amendment the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment,4
making no attempt to distinguish that clause from the evidentiary rule
against hearsay.5
Petitioner in Pointer and a co-defendant had been arrested for
robbery and identified by the victim at a preliminary hearing where
neither defendant was represented by counsel.; After the prosecutor
1. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
2. 346 U.S. at 196.
3. 380 U.S. 400, overruling West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him .... "
5. With the caveat that "simplification is falsification," McCormick offers the fol-
lowing definition of hearsay: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence,
of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show
the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility
of the out-of-court asserter." MCCORMIck, EviDENcE § 225 (1954). See also, 5 WoMoGst,
EVIDENCE § 1861; 6 id. § 1766 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. RIv. 177 (1948).
6. Right to counsel seems to have beckoned as an alternative, and innocuous, ground
of decision, but the Court found that problem more difficult than the one it ultimately
faced. The Court had interpreted Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 885 (1963), to require
that counsel be provided at any critical stage of a criminal proceeding, Including the
preliminary hearing. White v. Maryland, 873 U.S. 59 (1963). Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama
868 U.S. 52 (1961). But the Court distinguished those cases as having dealt with prelimi-
nary hearings that could have been the occasion for entering a plea; the Texas hearing
could not. 880 U.S. at 402. The Court expressly refused to decide whether there might
be other features of the Texas hearing so critical as to make counsel compulsory, im.
plying that the record was not sufficiently informative. 880 U.S. at 403. But the record
did show, at a minimum, that prosecution testimony could be taken at the Texas prelim-
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showed at the trial that the victim had left the state, he sought to in-
troduce a transcript of the testimony the victim gave at the preliminary
hearing. The defense attorney objected, claiming his client had been
denied "'confrontment of the witnessess .... ' "7 a contention rejected
by the trial and appellate courts. Reversing, the Supreme Court ob-
served that the right to cross-examine witnesses is included in the Sixth
Amendment right to confront them, and then incorporated the federal
confrontation standard into the Fourteenth Amendment.
With that stroke, the Court imposed on the states a doctrine of un-
certain reach. It did not elaborate past exegesis of the clause, which
has casually identified confrontation with the irreducible core of the
hearsay rule.$ The Court in Pointer, without mentioning hearsay,
recognized two exceptions to the rule against hearsay as exceptions
to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation requirement." Thus Pointer
inary hearing and preserved for later use at the trial. If the Court felt unable to hold
flatly that counsel was required at the Texas hearing, it might simply have ruled that
counsel was required at any hearing whose testimony was to be preserved for later trial.
Inasmuch as prosecutors could never be sure that every witness who testified at a prelim-
inary hearing would be able to appear at the trial, they would probably wish to guar-
antee that testimony could be preserved for later use by obtaining counsel for de-
fendants at all preliminary hearings. Still, such a rule of caveat prosecutor would not
have demanded a finding that the Texas preliminary hearing was by its very nature
a critical stage at which counsel was required.
7. Sso US. at 401.
8. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (Cardozo, J.):
Nor has the privilege of confrontation at any time been without recognized ex-
ceptions, as for instance dying declarations or documentary evidence. [Citation of
cases omitted.] The exceptions are not even static, but may be enlarged from time
to time if there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 US. 275, 282 (1897):
Nor does the provision that an accused person shall be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him prevent the admission of dying declarations, or the depositions
of witnesses who have died since the former trial.
Compare Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 US.
825 (1958), asserting the clause was
intended to prevent the trial of criminal cases upon affidavits, not to serve as a rigid
and inflexible barrier against the orderly development of reasonable and necessary
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
9. This Court has recognized the admissibility against an accused of dying dedara-
tions, [citation of cases omitted] and of testimony of a deceased witness who has
testified at a former trial. [Citation of cases omitted.] Nothing we hold here is to
the contrary.
380 US. at 407. This passage makes it difficult to interpret the decision as a first step
in reassessing the hearsay rule and establishing new standards of reliability for hearsay
exceptions. If any category of admissible hearsay deserves to be eliminated as part of
such a reassessment, it is the category of dying declarations. See Note 18 infra. Yet the
Court offered dying declarations as an example of unquestionably admissible hearsay.
1435
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
left undisturbed the notion that the hearsay rule and the constitu-
tional requirement are interchangeable.
Despite the superficial similarity between the evidentiary rule and
the constitutional clause,"' the Court should not be eager to equate
them. Present hearsay law does not merit a permanent niche in the
Constitution; indeed, its ripeness for reform is a unifying theme of
evidence literature. 1 From Bentham 12 to the authors of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 3 authorities have agreed that present hearsay law
keeps reliable evidence from the courtroom. If Pointer has read into
the Constitution a hearsay rule of unknown proportions, reformers
must grapple not only with centuries of inertia but with a constitu-
tional prohibition as well.
The major problem is not, however, scraping the barnacles from
hearsay law. No hearsay code, however streamlined, could serve ap-
propriately as a constitutional principle. The goal of any hearsay rule
is to admit hearsay when its out-of-court context can serve as an ac-
ceptable substitute for cross-examination.' 4 Thus dying declarations
are admitted on the theory that a man would not face death with a
lie on his lips. 5 This example illustrates two characteristics of hearsay
rules. First, they are at best a partial substitute for cross-examination.
Cross-examination helps expose all of the defects of testimony-defi-
ciencies of observation, errors in the use of words, distortions of
memory, and deliberate falsification.' 6 Here the out-of-court substi-
10. One writer has suggested that the constitutional right is based on a common law
principle which, in turn, finds its origin in a reaction to abuses at the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh. F. H. HE=, THm SixTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951). This apparently is the only
historical illumination the clause has received.
11. See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 344-46 (1961)
(collecting epithets).
12. See, e.g., 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 449-53 (1827); 3 id. 413.
13. UNIFORi RULE 63(4)(c) holds admissible,
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating, describing or ex-
plaining an event or condition which the judge finds was made by the declarant at
a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his recollec-
tion was clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of the action.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 200 (1953).
The rule represents on its face a considerable liberalization. But it is weakened by the
Commissioners' Note ("Clause (c) is drafted so as to indicate an attitude of reluctance
and require most careful scrutiny in admitting hearsay statements under its provisions."
Ibid.) and by the Prefatory Note to the entire set of rules ("Of course a given rule
would be inoperative in a given situation when there would occur from its application
an invasion of constitutional rights." Id. at 163.).
14. 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1420.
15. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892).
16. For an extensive analysis of how effectively hearsay rules deal with problems of
narration, sincerity, memory and perception, see Morgan, supra note 5.
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tute-fear of impending death-assures at most sincerity." And even
if it gave some assurance of the other aspects of reliability, it would
lack the unique potency of cross-examination. Only cross-examination
subjects testimony to the ordeal of a hostile adversary's probe for
weaknesses.
A second defect is equally crucial. Inevitably, any hearsay rule is
arbitrary. The judge cannot halt the trial to ponder the reliability of
every item of hearsay evidence; nor can attorneys calculate reliability
in time to object to hearsay in a running narrative. They must have
broad categories of admissibility which yield an effortless decision.
In this area, rules of law must be rules of thumb. All we can ask is
that the categories of admissible hearsay be generally reliable; any
particular example may be suspect and call for the exercise by a trial
judge of his discretion to exclude unreliable evidence.
In summary, no hearsay rule closely approximates the advantages of
confrontation; and no rule accurately distinguishes between reliable
and unreliable evidence. There are, no doubt, better and worse at-
tempts. But experts cannot begin to sort them out; the empirical evi-
dence is scanty and ambiguous.' 8 There is no basis for exalting any
of these ragged approximations as the essence of the confrontation
clause. The Court should not cast itself in this area, as it has in no
others, as the final arbiter of the reliability of evidence.
When faced directly with problems of evidentiary weight, the Court
has been wary. Its few forays into this swamp have been circumspect.
Thompson v. City of Louisville0 and its progeny20 mark the outer
limits. Petitioner in Thompson was arrested for loitering when police
17. The guarantee of sincerity seems the one most characteristic of the exceptions to
the rule against hearsay. Morgan, supra note 5 at 203; Maguire, The Hearsay System:
Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741, 749 (1961). See also MoDEL. CODE
oF EViDENCE 221-22 (1942).
18. See, e.g., Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Etidence,
Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 432 (1928). Paradoxically, the Court in
Pointer chose one of the most vulnerable exceptions--dying declarations-as an example
of an evidentiary category that meets constitutional standards. See note 9 supra. Of all
the exceptions, the one for dying declarations has been called "the most m)stical in its
theory and the most arbitrary in its limitations." McCowNtsm, EviDF ce § 258 (1954). The
verbal product of a death agony would seem to be of dubious reliability.
19. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
20. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 94 (1965); Garner v. Louisiana.
368 U.S. 157 (1961). Though Thompson is best known for establishing the principle that
conviction may not be had on no evidence, its holding was foreshadowed in Schware v.
Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Rhetorically, however, the Court in Schware
measured the sanity of bar examiners not the weight of evidence: "There is no evidence
in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Schware was morally unfit to
practice law." 353 U.S. at 24647.
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entered a cafe and saw him shuffling his feet in time to background
music. The arresting officers added a charge of disturbing the peace
when petitioner became argumentative as they led him away. He was
convicted of both charges in police court. Reversing, the Supreme
Court said the question before it turned "not on the sufficiency of
the evidence, but on whether this conviction rests upon any evidence
at all."'21 If any explanation of the case was necessary, the Court pro-
vided it in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham: "The proposition
for which that case stands is simple and clear. It has nothing to do
with concepts relating to the weight or sufficiency of evidence in any
particular case. It goes, rather, to the most basic concepts of due process
of law. ' 22
If the Court adds a hearsay rule to the Constitution, it will face the
case-by-case review of evidence that it sidestepped in Thompson. Hear-
say questions demand particularized judgment, and require as much
familiarity with the record as with the rulebook. Only by sifting the
evidence itself can the Court be sure that a particular use of hearsay
is not harmless error or the exercise of trial court discretion. But no
task could be further from the Supreme Court's constitutional func-
tion than the exercise of routine appellate review.
This is not to say that there is no room in the Constitution for a
requirement of some measure of evidentiary reliability. But this re-
quirement should be enforced through the due process clause, not
the confrontation clause.2 3 As Thompson and its progeny illustrate,
hearsay problems are not the only ones that arise in connection with
criminal trial evidence. The potential for admitting worthless evi-
dence is as broad as the range of facts that may be presented in a court-
room, either through testimonial or real proof. The confrontation
clause, even if given the widest interpretation possible under Pointer,
protects only against weaknesses in testimony that arise for want of
cross-examination. Moreover, if there exists this basic and extensive
concern with minimal reliability, it should not be confined to criminal
cases as it would be under the confrontation clause. Only due process
is pervasive enough to reach the evil.
The confrontation clause should serve a discrete and more limited
function. It should focus on the legitimate concerns raised by a liber-
alized hearsay rule: that such a rule may institutionalize baseless prose-
21. 362 U.S. at 199.
22. 382 US. 87, 94 (1965).
23. Compare Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
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cutions, or at least tempt prosecutors to use hearsay instead of live
witnesses whose demeanor is unimpressive; or that it may induce
prosecutorial negligence in securing witnesses by holding out the easy
alternative of presenting their statements through other witnesses.
Such pratices undermine any system of criminal justice that presumes
innocence and insists that the process of rebutting the presumption
be absolutely above reproach.
Fears of this sort would be allayed by a confrontation clause read
not as a Delphic reference to the essence of the hearsay rule, but as
a canon of prosecutorial behavior. The clause should be held to re-
quire that the prosecutor make a diligent, good-faith effort to produce
witnesses to testify. So read, the clause would bind the prosecutor re-
gardless of whether some exception to the rule against hearsay would
allow the prospective witness' testimony to be recounted by others.24
The objection to the prosecutor's presentation of hearsay instead
of an available witness is not that such hearsay necessarily is less reli-
able than the hearsay of an unavailable witness, but that the prosecutor
has made the testimony less reliable than it might have been.".
Although the Supreme Court never has discussed confrontation ex-
plicitly in terms of prosecutorial behavior, its decisions strongly sug-
gest such a rule. Greene v. McElroy2 6 presents a striking example of
objectionable failure by the government to present witnesses.27 Greene
dealt with the dismissal of an executive of a private company that
held defense contracts solely because his security clearance had been
revoked by a Defense Department security board. The revocation
came after a hearing at which the government presented no witnesses.
"It was obvious, however.., that the Board relied on confidential
reports which were never made available to petitioner.... Petitioner
had no opportunity to confront and question persons whose statements
reflected adversely on him or to confront the government investigators
who took their statements."28 The Court sidestepped the constitutional
24. For example, although an excited utterance is admissible under conventional
hearsay rules, McCoancK, EvmrncE § 272 (1954), the prosecutor would be required
under the proposed standard to produce an available witness.
25. Cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
26. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
27. Though petitioner suffered no criminal sanction, the loss of his job and the
damage to his reputation that followed the loss of security clearance apparently verc
sufficient to warrant application by the Court of criminal trial standards. The govern-
ment's failure in Greene to present witnesses was not unique. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby,
349 US. 331 (1955); Bailey v. Richardson 341 US. 918 (1951), affinning per curiam by an
equally divided court 182 F.2d 46 (1950); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
Compare Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
28. 360 US. at 479.
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question, holding that the Board was authorized by Congress and the
President to conduct only the kind of security clearance program
"which affords affected persons the safeguards of confrontation and
cross-examination." 29
A confrontation clause incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
speaks not only to the threat of Big Government foreshadowed by the
Defense Department's Industrial Security Board, but also to the home-
spun guile and sloth of local prosecutors. The obligation of federal
prosecutors to present at trial the best available evidence was estab-
lished in leading decisions under the confrontation clause before
Pointer extended it to the states. Petitioner in Kirby v. United States80
was charged with receiving stolen goods. The Court found error in
the admission, to prove the property was stolen, of evidence that three
other persons had been convicted of stealing it. In Motes v. United
States31 petitioner's conviction was reversed because the trial judge
admitted a transcript of testimony taken at a preliminary hearing
after a showing that the witness' absence was due to the prosecutor's
negligence. In both cases the prosecutors settled for second-hand evi-
dence. In neither was there a showing that first-hand evidence was
unavailable.
Pointer and its companion case, Douglas v. Alabama,32 come within
the compass of the earlier decisions. In Pointer the state where the trial
was held and the state where the key witness had gone were signatories
to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from With-
out the State,83 which, in effect, allows interstate service of process.
Since the victim's hearsay testimony was the most damaging piece of
evidence against petitioner, it was reasonable to require that the pro-
secutor undergo the slight inconvenience of using the act to insure
the witness' presence. There is no indication that he attempted to do
SO.
In Douglas the prosecutor knew in advance that a witness he in-
tended to call, a confessed accomplice of the defendant who had been
convicted at a separate trial, would avoid damaging his chances for
an appeal by refusing on Fifth Amendment grounds to testify. None-
theless, he was called. When he refused to testify, the prosecutor read
aloud from his confession, which incriminated the defendant, pausing
29. Id. at 506.
30. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
31. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
32. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
33. CAL. PE:4. CODE §§ 1334-34.6; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 24.28 (1966).
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at intervals to inquire whether the witness remembered having made
the statements attributed to him. The Court reversed the defendant's
conviction.
It is arguable that however cynical the prosecutor's charade, he did
present the best available evidence by bringing a live witness to the
stand. When the witness refused to testify, he had no choice but to
rely upon hearsay testimony. So read, Douglas would equate confron-
tation with the hearsay rule. But it was not simply the introduction of
hearsay that disturbed the Court. The confession might have been ad-
missible under conventional hearsay law as a declaration against penal
interest,34 and in fact was described in the testimony of two policemen.
The prosecutor, however, knowing in advance the witness would re-
fuse to testify, called him simply to enhance the credibility of the
confession by putting words in the witness' instead of the prosecutor's
mouth; that is, to profit from the same illusion that for ages has made
ventriloquism such an engaging folk art. It was this enhancement of
credibility and not simply the presentation of hearsay that drew the
Court's major objection. The Court distinguished between the prose-
cutor's reading and the witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
The former indicated only that the confession was made by the wit-
ness. This inference could be partially tested by cross-examining the
two policemen who had testified that the confession was made. But
the witness' reliance on the Fifth Amendment suggested that the con-
fession implicating the defendant was true; that inference could not
be tested because only the witness was competent to discuss it and he
refused to testify.35
The cases in which the Court has denied claims based on the con-
frontation clause do not appear to involve violations of the proposed
standard, and thus are consistent with it3(l This frees the Court to
34. See UNisoas RuLEs or EviDENCE 63(10).
35. 380 US. at 419-20. In Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965). the Court re-
versed a conviction after the credibility of witnesses' testimony had been enhanced in a
way that put it beyond attack by cross-examination. Two deputy sheriffs, important
witnesses at a murder trial, had custody of the jury. ". . . [T]he relationship was one
which could not but foster the jurors' confidence in those who were their official guard.
ians during the entire period of the triaL" Id. at 474. The case pre-dated Pointer and
Douglas, however, and the due process standard was employed.
36. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (view by jury of crime scene held
not to present confrontation problem); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911)
(judge, cerk and official reporter who certified that defendants had been arraigned and
had pleaded in trial court not "witnesses" within the meaning of a statute embodying
the constitutional standard.); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1845) (cross-examined
testimony of deceased witnesses held admissible). But cf., Salinger v. United States, 272
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interpret the confrontation clause as a standard of prosecutorial be-
havior and to abandon the unwieldy and unwise hearsay-confrontation
equation suggested by the rhetoric in Pointer.
U.S. 542 (1926) (letters from persons not called as witnesses admitted to explain replies
by accused to them-perhaps a marginal case, though the most damaging evidence ap-
pears to have come from letters written by the accused).
